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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-2463 
______________ 
 
CLIFFORD MURRAY, 
  
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; THE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF PENNSYLVANIA 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-09-04960) 
Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 24, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  November 10, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
______________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
  does not constitute binding precedent.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 A jury convicted appellant Clifford Murray in a Pennsylvania state court of first-
degree murder and other offenses.  Before he completed his post-conviction state court 
challenges to his conviction, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District 
Court contending that his trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective.  In 
particular, he maintained that the jury instructions improperly indicated that he could be 
convicted of that offense based on his accomplice’s specific intent to kill even if he, 
Murray, did not have such an intent.  The District Court proceedings were held in 
abeyance until completion of Murray’s unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings 
and then were activated but Murray again was unsuccessful.  He then appealed to this 
Court.  We now hold that the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the last state court to consider 
his contention, did not act unreasonably in concluding that the jury charge, when viewed 
as a whole, properly informed the jury that Murray had to have a specific intent to kill the 
victim to be convicted of first-degree murder.  Therefore, Murray is not entitled to habeas 
corpus relief and we will affirm the order of the District Court denying Murray’s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 On July 29, 1981, Murray was arrested for the homicide of Joseph Lewis Porter, in 
Philadelphia on January 28, 1981.  Porter had sustained seven gunshot wounds, five from 
.32 caliber bullets and two from .38 caliber bullets.  The .32 caliber bullets hit Porter’s 
upper body, including his chest, and the .38 caliber bullets hit Porter’s lower body.  Two 
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eyewitnesses identified Murray and another man, William Hunter, as the shooters.  After 
his arrest, Murray provided police with a signed written confession, in which he stated 
that when he saw Porter, Hunter handed him, Murray, a .38 caliber gun and said, “Come 
on.  We are going to get him.”  App. 454-55.  According to the confession, Hunter then 
shot Porter repeatedly with a .32 caliber gun, while Murray shot him with the .38 caliber 
gun.  Id. 454. 
 Murray was indicted and tried in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas 
in November 1983 on charges of first- and third-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime.  In his closing argument, 
the prosecutor described the distinction between first- and third-degree murder as 
follows: 
 Now, the difference between first- and third-degree murder is found 
in the intent of the actor, . . . the intent of the person who does the killing. 
 
 If you specifically intend to kill another person, you are guilty of 
first-degree murder.  If you specifically intend only to cause serious bodily 
injury to another person, but death results anyway, you are guilty of third-
degree murder.  That, pure and simple is the difference between the two 
degrees. 
 
 Now, an example of third-degree murder might be getting into an 
argument with someone and you shoot him in the leg.  Now clearly you 
don’t intend to kill anybody when you shoot him in the leg, but, let’s say it 
severs the major artery in the leg and the deceased bleeds to death before 
he’s treated by a physician.  That is third-degree murder, because you 
intended to hurt him bodily, but didn’t intend to kill him, but death results 
anyway.  That is third-degree murder. 
 
 It is not third-degree murder when you shoot someone seven times, -
- seven times.  When you shoot someone seven times, you intend to kill 
him.  Now, some of you may be thinking right now, well, if we believe that 
this defendant had the .38, he only shot the deceased twice, and he didn’t 
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shoot him in the chest.  That was inflicted by the .32.  Well, the defendant 
is also charged with conspiracy in this case.  He also is an accomplice of 
the person that he commits the crime with.  And the law is that if you 
conspire with someone, if you make a [. . . .]1 to commit an illegal act, then 
you’re guilty not only for what you do, but also for the other guy.  You are 
responsible for everything. 
 
 So if you find that Clifford Murray and Willie Hunter shot the 
deceased together, then Clifford Murray is responsible for the shots to the 
chest and the other four shots that came from the .32 as well as the two that 
he fired into the deceased’s body.  That makes it a case of first-degree 
murder, ladies and gentlemen.  Seven gunshots makes it a case of first-
degree murder . . . . 
 
Id. 670-72. 
 Before providing this description of the law to the jurors, the prosecutor cautioned 
them that the judge “is the only word on the law in this Courtroom” and that they should 
“disregard” any part of his discussion of first- versus third-degree murder that conflicts 
with what the judge instructs them.  Id. 638.  The judge likewise instructed the jury to 
follow the law as he gives it, irrespective of anything the attorneys may have said during 
their closing arguments.  Id. 679. 
 The judge instructed the jury as to the “crimes” of first-degree murder and third-
degree murder.  As to first-degree murder, the judge instructed: 
 Now, you may find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder if 
you are satisfied that the following four elements have been proven by the 
Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 First, that Joseph Lewis Porter is dead. 
 
 Second, that the defendant or an accomplice killed him. 
                                              
1 The omitted word is not clear in the transcript but Murray indicates in his brief that the 
word is “conspiracy” which fits in the context.  In any event, the omission is not material 
to the Court’s resolution of the legal issues before it.   
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 Third, that the killing was committed by a person with a specific 
intent to kill the victim. 
 
 And fourth, that the killing was committed with malice. 
 
Id. 683.  The judge’s instructions on third-degree murder mirrored these except as to the 
third element:  “Third, that although the act of the defendant or his accomplice resulted in 
the death of Joseph Lewis Porter, no intent to take human life existed or could reasonably 
be inferred, but, rather, an intention existed merely to inflict grievous bodily harm, and 
yet as a result of the infliction of the injury, death resulted.”  Id. 685-86. 
 Later, the judge gave the following instructions with respect to accomplice 
liability and criminal conspiracy: 
 It is the law in this Commonwealth that a person is guilty of an 
offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another 
person for which he is legally accountable or both.  A person is legally 
accountable for the conduct of another person in the commission of an 
offense when with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of 
the offense, he, one, solicits the other person to commit it, or, two, aids the 
other person in planning or committing it, or, three, agrees or attempts to 
aid such other person in planning or committing it. 
 
. . . . 
 
 Now, a person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if with the intent of 
promoting or facilitating the commission of a crime, he agrees, or plans 
with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will 
engage in conduct which constitutes the crime, or will attempt or solicit to 
commit the crime, or agrees to aid such other person or persons in planning 
the crime. 
 
. . . . 
 
 It must be shown that a conspirator acted with the intent to commit a 
crime, in this case, murder, and that an overt act was committed by a co-
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conspirator or pursuant to the conspiracy.  The overt act alleged is that they 
did possess a gun. 
 
Id. 709-12. 
 The jury found Murray guilty of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to 
commit murder, and possession of an instrument of crime.  After a tangled procedural 
history, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Murray’s convictions on February 14, 
2005, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Murray’s petition for permission to 
appeal.  Murray filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in the Pennsylvania 
courts, arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
in failing to object to the jury charge on first-degree murder, which suggested that 
Murray could be convicted based on his accomplice’s specific intent to kill.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, and Murray appealed.  On November 3, 
2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial, reasoning that the jury 
instructions as a whole adequately informed the jury that Murray himself had to possess a 
specific intent to kill to be convicted of first-degree murder.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Murray’s petition for permission to appeal, and Murray did not seek 
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.     
 On October 29, 2009, while the state court proceedings were still pending, Murray 
filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court reiterating the 
claim that trial counsel had been ineffective when he failed to object to the first-degree 
murder instructions.2  The Court, adopting a magistrate judge’s report and 
                                              
2 He also advanced other contentions, but we are not concerned with them on this appeal. 
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recommendation, denied Murray’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing as it 
concluded that the Pennsylvania Superior Court acted reasonably in rejecting Murray’s 
challenge to the first-degree murder instructions.  It nevertheless granted a certificate of 
appealability limited to that issue, and Murray has appealed.3  
 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, and we 
have jurisdiction based on the District Court’s certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  See Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 134 S.Ct. 2700 (2014).  Where, as here, the District Court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, we review its decision de novo.  Id. 
Although our review of the District Court’s decision is de novo, we accord 
“considerable deference,” to the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  See 
Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2014); Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 
196 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).  Under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
2254, where, as here, a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits and the claim 
does not rest on a challenge to state court factual findings, a habeas corpus petitioner may 
prevail on the claim only if he shows that the state court decision “was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 Appellees do not contend the Murray has not exhausted his state court remedies or that 
his ineffective counsel claim is procedurally barred. 
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by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254; Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000).  To qualify as such an “unreasonable 
application” of Supreme Court precedent, the state court decision must have been 
“‘objectively unreasonable,’ not merely wrong; ‘clear error’ will not suffice.”  White v. 
Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76, 
123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003)).  The petitioner must show that the state court’s ruling “was 
so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”   Id. (quoting 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011)).  In considering whether a petitioner 
has made this showing, a court must recognize that the more general the rule that the 
Supreme Court articulates, the more leeway a state court has in its application of that rule 
to the facts of a particular case.  See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004)).  Furthermore, the state court 
need not cite or even be aware of Supreme Court precedent for its decision to warrant the 
deference under the AEDPA.  See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365 
(2002); Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 397-98 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 Murray argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to 
object to the jury charge on first-degree murder as Murray contends that the charge 
violated due process of law by relieving the Commonwealth from its burden to prove that 
he personally intended to kill Porter.  To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
9 
 
counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) that counsel’s performance deficiently “fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that this deficient performance 
prejudiced the petitioner’s defense.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).  But counsel does not act ineffectively if he does not 
present an argument or objection that lacks merit.  See Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 
225 n.23 (3d Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Tennis, 549 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2008).  In passing 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must consider counsel’s representation 
of the defendant as of the time of that representation.  See Branch, 758 F.3d at 235. 
 By the time of Murray’s trial, the Supreme Court had held that a jury instruction 
violates due process if it relieves the prosecution from having to prove an essential 
element of the crime, such as the defendant’s mental state.  See Sandstrom v. Montana, 
442 U.S. 510, 520-21, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2457-58 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970)).  Moreover, by the time of Murray’s trial, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had made clear that an individual could not be convicted of 
first-degree murder in the absence of proof that he personally possessed a specific intent 
to kill the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Bachert, 453 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1982) (“[T]he 
requisite mental state must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be one which the 
accomplice harbored and cannot depend upon proof of intent to kill only in the 
principal.”). 
 On this basis, Murray contends that the jury charge on first-degree murder 
improperly permitted the jurors to convict him based on Hunter’s intent, rather than his 
own intent, by instructing them that either “the defendant or the accomplice” had to kill 
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Porter and that the killing had to be “committed by a person with a specific intent to kill 
the victim.”  App. 683 (emphasis added).   Though this argument has surface appeal, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that “not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a 
jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.”   Middleton v. McNeil, 541 
U.S. 433, 437, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 1832 (2004).   “Rather, the [petitioner] must show both 
that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was ‘a reasonable likelihood’ that the 
jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 
179, 190-91, 129 S.Ct. 823, 831 (2009) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 
S.Ct. 475, 482 (1991)); see Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d at 223.  The challenged jury 
instruction “‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the 
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.”  Waddington, 555 U.S. at 191, 
129 S.Ct. at 832 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 482). 
 In the state post-conviction relief proceedings, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
the last state court to consider the matter on the merits, acknowledged that, considered in 
isolation, the first-degree murder charge misstated Pennsylvania law.  It concluded, 
however, that Murray’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the charge 
because the instructions as a whole adequately advised the jury that Murray had to 
possess a specific intent to kill in order to be convicted of first-degree murder.  App. 791-
93 (citing Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 430-32 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth 
v. Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 460-61 (Pa. 2004)).  In particular, the court emphasized that the 
jury instructions on both accomplice liability and criminal conspiracy required that 
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Murray had to have acted with the intent of promoting or facilitating the homicide to be 
convicted.  App. 791-92. 
 The Commonwealth argues that our analysis need go no further because a federal 
habeas corpus court may not “‘reexamine state court determinations on state-law 
questions,’” and, accordingly, we are “[b]ound by the state court’s determination that the 
instruction at issue comported with state law.”  Priester, 382 F.3d at 402 (quoting Estelle, 
502 U.S. at 66-67, 112 S.Ct. at 480).  However, a determination of whether there was a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would apply the instruction so as to relieve the 
Commonwealth of its burden of proving an essential element of the crime presents a 
federal due process question that is not answered by the state court’s interpretation of the 
instructions.  See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971-72 
(1985); Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516-17, 99 S.Ct. at 2455-56; Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 
400, 408, 413 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 Nevertheless, the Superior Court’s ruling still warrants deference under the 
AEDPA, and we conclude that it did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent.  Murray contends that the accomplice liability and 
criminal conspiracy instructions could not have remedied the deficiency in the first-
degree murder charge because the jurors might have understood these instructions to 
mean that they could convict him of first-degree murder if they found him complicit in a 
third-degree murder.  This argument fails. 
 In Waddington, a habeas corpus petitioner argued that a Washington state jury 
may have convicted him of second-degree murder based only on his complicity in an 
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assault.  See 555 U.S. at 188, 129 S.Ct. at 830.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, relying on the language of the accomplice liability instruction that an 
accomplice “in the commission of the crime” must have acted “with knowledge that it 
will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime.”  Id. at 191, 129 S.Ct. at 832 
(emphasis in original).  The Court held that the Washington state courts reasonably 
determined the instruction to be unambiguous given that its use of the definite article 
“the” made clear that the jury could convict the petitioner as an accomplice to murder 
only if it found that he acted with knowledge that his conduct would aid in the murder.  
See id. at 191-92, 129 S.Ct. at 832. 
 The accomplice liability charge in the present case similarly instructed that “[a] 
person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person in the commission of an 
offense” only if he acted “with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of 
the offense.”  App. 709 (emphasis added).  As in Waddington, it was not objectively 
unreasonable for the state court to conclude that this instruction made clear that Murray 
could be convicted as an accomplice to first-degree murder only if he specifically 
intended to promote or facilitate the offense of first-degree murder.  Murray asserts that 
first-degree murder and third-degree murder constitute the same “offense” of murder, but 
the judge’s instructions referred to the different types of criminal homicide as distinct 
“crimes.”  Id. 682.  In the circumstances, there is no meaningful distinction between the 
terms “the crime,” as addressed in Waddington, and “the offense,” the term the trial court 
used here in its charge.  Accordingly, the Superior Court reasonably concluded that 
Murray’s due process claim lacks merit and that his trial counsel did not provide 
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ineffective assistance in failing to object to the jury instructions.  See Williams, 637 F.3d 
at 225 n.23. 
 In arguing that the jury could have been misled by the instructions as a whole, 
Murray relies on three of our opinions in which we held that the instructions were 
constitutionally defective.  See Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 426-27 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 512 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith, 120 F.3d at 411-14.  We may 
not, however, “‘consul[t] [our] own precedents, rather than those of [the Supreme Court], 
in assessing’ a habeas claim governed by § 2254.”  White, 134 S.Ct. at 1702 n.2 (quoting 
Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam)); see Renico v. Lett, 559 
U.S. 766, 779, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010).  None of our opinions that Murray cites 
“purport to reflect clearly established law as set out in [the Supreme Court’s] holdings,” 
Parker, 132 S.Ct. at 155 (emphasis omitted), as none of them employed the deference 
owed under the AEDPA to state court adjudications on the merits.  See Laird, 414 F.3d at 
423, 428; Everett, 290 F.3d at 509; Smith, 120 F.3d at 420 & n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
Indeed, one of the judges in Smith would have held that the instructions were not 
ambiguous when considered as a whole, see 120 F.3d at 423-24 (Alito, J., dissenting), 
and we reached a similar conclusion in a not precedential opinion that did apply AEDPA 
deference.  See Brockington v. Vaughn, 66 F. App’x 436, 437-41 (3d Cir. 2003).    
 We acknowledge that the mere fact that some federal courts have applied federal 
law in the same way as the Superior Court in this case does not by itself establish that the 
state court acted reasonably, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409-10, 120 S.Ct. at 
1521-22, but this recognition does provide some support for a conclusion that the state 
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court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable.  See White, 134 S.Ct. at 1703 n.3; 
Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2004).  On the particular facts of this 
case, fairminded jurists could disagree about how to apply the general rule that jury 
instructions violate due process if there exists a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury 
misunderstood the instructions, considered as a whole.  See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-
87. 
 Murray finally contends that the prosecutor’s closing argument created a 
reasonable likelihood that the jurors misapplied the instructions and convicted him of 
first-degree murder even if they did not believe that he personally possessed a specific 
intent to kill.  The prosecutor’s closing may have been misleading insofar as it called for 
the jury to find that Murray had the specific intent to kill necessary for a first-degree 
murder conviction on the basis of the shots that Hunter fired, without pointing to other 
evidence of Murray’s intent so as to establish his criminal liability for Hunter’s conduct.  
Given our conclusion, however, that the Superior Court acted reasonably in holding that 
the instructions were unambiguous when considered as a whole, we need not consider the 
effect of the prosecutor’s closing on the jury.4  See Waddington, 555 U.S. at 191-92, 129 
S.Ct. at 832.  Moreover, both the prosecutor and the Court told the jury to disregard the 
prosecutor’s discussion of the law to the extent it conflicted with the instructions 
provided by the Court, and we presume that the jury followed this instruction.  See 
                                              
4 Murray initially brought an independent challenge to this aspect of the prosecutor’s 
closing argument, but the District Court held that the Superior Court acted reasonably in 
rejecting this challenge, and it did not grant a certificate of appealability on this issue.  
App. 3, 799-801, 828-30. 
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Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 733 (2000); Francis, 471 U.S. at 
324 n.9, 105 S.Ct. at 1976 n.9. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order docketed April 
30, 2013, denying Murray’s habeas corpus petition.  
